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Abstract
The investigation of the terrorist attack is a time-critical task. The
investigators have a limited time window to diagnose the organizational
background of the terrorists, to run down and arrest the wire-pullers,
and to take an action to prevent or eradicate the terrorist attack. The
intuitive interface to visualize the intelligence data set stimulates the in-
vestigators’ experience and knowledge, and aids them in decision-making
for an immediately effective action. This paper presents a computational
method to analyze the intelligence data set on the collective actions of
the perpetrators of the attack, and to visualize it into the form of a so-
cial network diagram which predicts the positions where the wire-pullers
conceals themselves.
1 Introduction
Terrorist attacks cause great economic, social and environmental impacts. The
disaster by the terrorist attacks is different from the emergence arising from
earthquakes or hurricanes, in that active non-routine responses are always nec-
essary, and often possible. The investigation of the terrorist attacks and the
responses are, however, a time-critical task. The investigators have a limited
time window to diagnose the organizational background of the terrorists, to run
down and arrest the wire-pullers, and to take an action to prevent or eradicate
the attack. The arrest of the wire-pullers is more likely to dismantle the terrorist
organization than that of the perpetrators. This is because a limited number
of persons can provide the perpetrators with financial supports and elaborate
plots, while a perpetrator can be replaced by another person easily.
Let us show an example in the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001. Mustafa A.
Al-Hisawi, whose alternate name was Mustafa Al-Hawsawi, was alleged to be
∗Corresponding author, Graduate School of Systems Management, Tsukuba University,
Otsuka Bunkyo-ku, 112-0012 Tokyo, Japan. email: maeno.yoshiharu@nifty.com.
†School of Engineering, University of Tokyo, Hongo Bunkyo-ku, 113-8656 Tokyo, Japan.
email: ohsawa@sys.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp.
1
a wire-puller, who had acted as a financial manager of Al Qaeda. He had at-
tempted to help terrorists enter the United States, and provided the hijackers
of the 4 aircrafts with financial support worth more than 300,000 dollars, ac-
cording to Wikipedia (free encyclopedia on WWW). Furthermore, Usama bin
Laden is suspected to be a wire-puller behind Mustafa A. Al-Hisawi and the
conspirators behind the hijackers.
This paper presents a computational method to analyze the intelligence data
set on the collective actions of the perpetrators of the terrorist attack, and to
visualize it into the form of a social network diagram which predicts the positions
where the wire-pullers conceals themselves. The intuitive interface between the
intelligence data set and the investigator through the social network diagram is
expected to stimulate the investigators’ experience and knowledge, and to aid
them in decision-making for an immediately effective action. Mathematically,
the objective of the analysis is to solve a node discovery problem in a complex
network. Two layers are assumed in this problem. The first layer describes the
latent pattern of the communication among persons, which is the transmission
of the influence on decision-making. It is modeled by a graph structure, where
nodes are persons, and links indicate the presence of communication among the
persons. The structure is assumed not to be observable directly. The second
layer describes the observable pattern of collective actions of the persons. It
appears as a result of the communication in the latent layer. Part, or all of
this pattern is assumed to be observable. To solve the node discovery problem
means to discover some clues on the covert nodes, which participate in the
communication in the latent layer, but do not appear in the collective actions
in the observable layer.
Related works are reviewed briefly in the section 2. A method to solve
the node discovery problem is developed in the section 3. The section 4 demon-
strates an example where the perpetrators and a wire-puller in the 9/11 terrorist
attack are analyzed. The section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Related works
Social network analysis [3] is a study of social structures, which are made of
nodes (individuals, organizations etc.), which are linked by one or more specific
types of relationship (transmission of influence, presence of trust etc.). Terrorist
or criminal organizations have been studied empirically [20]. Factor analysis is
applied to study email exchange in Enron, which ended in bankruptcy due to the
institutionalized accounting fraud [11]. The criminal organizations tend to be
strings of inter-linked small groups that lack a central leader, but to coordinate
their activities along logistic trails and through bonds of friends. Hypothesis
can be built by paying attention to remarkable white spots and hard-to-fill po-
sitions in a network [12]. The conspirators in the 9/11 terrorist organization
are relevant in reducing the distance between hijackers, and enhancing commu-
nication efficiently [13]. The 9/11 terrorists’ social network is investigated from
the viewpoint of efficiency and security trade-off [18]. More security-oriented
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structure arises from longer time-to-task of the terrorists’ objectives. The con-
spirators improve communication efficiency, preserving hijackers’ small visibility
and exposure.
Research interests have been extending from describing characteristic nature,
toward modeling and predicting unknown phenomena. A hidden Markov model
and a Bayesian network are combined to predict the behavior of terrorists [22].
A link discovery and node discovery are typical problems in prediction tasks.
The link discovery predicts the existence of an unknown link between two nodes
from the information on the known attributes of the nodes and the known links
[9]. The Markov random network is an undirected graphical model similar to a
Bayesian network, which is used to learn the dependency between the links which
share a node [1], [6]. The link discovery techniques are combined with domain-
specific heuristics and expertise, and applied to many practical problems. The
Markov random network is applied to collaborative classification of web pages
[23]. Prediction of the collaboration between scientists from the published co-
authorship is studied [15]. Inference of the friendship between people from
the information available on their web pages is studied [2]. Missing links in a
hierarchical network is predicted by estimating the parameters of a dendrogram,
which generates the observed network structure [4]. The dendrogram is a tree
diagram used to illustrate the arrangement of the hierarchical clusters.
On the other hand, the node discovery predicts the existence of an unknown
node around the known nodes from the information on the collective behavior of
the network. Related works in the node discovery is, however, limited. Heuristic
method for node discovery is proposed in [16], [19]. The method is applied to
analyze the covert social network foundation behind the terrorism disasters [17].
Learning techniques of latent variables can be employed, once the presence of
a node is known. [21] studied learning of a structure of a linear latent variable
graph. [7] studied learning of a structure of a dynamic probabilistic network.
But, while the accuracy of the heuristic method is limited, these principled ana-
lytic approaches in learning are not practical to handle real human relationship
and communication observed in a social network, where much complexity ap-
pears. The complexity includes bi-directional and cyclic influence among many
observed and latent nodes. We need an efficient and accurate method to solve
the node discovery problem.
3 Method for inference, discovery, and visual-
ization
3.1 Intelligence data set
Imagine a situation where an investigator diagnoses the intelligence data set for
the run-down of the wire-puller behind the terrorist attack. Figure 1 illustrates
the situation. The pattern of the communication among perpetrators and a wire-
puller in the terrorist organization lies in the latent layer. It is the transmission
of the influence on decision-making. The pattern governs that of the collective
3
Figure 1: Investigator diagnosing the intelligence data set for the run-down of
the wire-puller behind the terrorist attack. The communication and influence
on decision-making among the perpetrators and a wire-puller in the terrorist
organization governs the pattern of the collective actions (such as attending an
meeting or event) of the perpetrators who have prepared for the attack. The
communication and influence are assumed not to be observable directly. Part or
all of the collective actions are assumed to be observable. The intelligence data
set consists of the secret agents’ records on the collective actions of the perpe-
trators. The wire-puller does not appear in the intelligence. After link inference
and node discovery, the intelligence data set is visualized into an intuitively
understandable social network diagram.
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actions of the perpetrators who have prepared for the terrorist attack in the
observable layer. The collective actions are attending an meeting or event, for
example.
The intelligence data set consists of the secret agents’ records on the col-
lective actions of the perpetrators. The wire-puller, however, does not appear
in the intelligence. The wire-puller is referred to by a covert node ncvt. The
investigator applies three tools: (1) link inference to infer the communication
between the perpetrators, (2) node discovery to discover the position of the
wire-puller, and (3) visualization of the result of the inference and discovery
into the form of a social network diagram. The social network diagram serves
as an intuitive interface to understand the intelligence data set.
Mathematical definition of the intelligence data set is given here. In eq.(1),
δi represents the participants to single communication in the latent layer. It is
a set of nodes nj .
δi = {nj}. (1)
It is assumed that the individual intelligence data obtained from the observ-
able layer is the pattern in eq.(1) minus the covert node ncvt. It is denoted by
eq.(2).
di = δi\{ncvt}. (2)
The whole intelligence data set is denoted by D in eq.(3). The number of
intelligence data is |d|.
D = {di} (0 ≤ i ≤ |d| − 1). (3)
The intelligence data set D can be expressed by a two dimensional matrix
of binary variables. The presence, or absence of the node nj in the intelligence
data di is represented by eq.(4). The number of node species is given by |n|.
dij =
{
1 if nj ∈ di
0 otherwise
(0 ≤ j ≤ |n| − 1). (4)
The intelligence data set is the input to the method for link inference, node
discovery, and visualization. The nodes in an intelligence data do not necessarily
form a clique structure, where there are links between every pair of nodes.
Assuming that they formed a clique would result in a very densely connected
structure in the latent layer. Such a superficial interpretation of the intelligence
data set leads to a wrong understanding of the terrorist organization. This is
why we need a new computational method. The method is described below.
3.2 Link inference
The communication in the latent layer is modeled by a graph. Strictly speaking,
a graph, a diagram, and a map are defined differently. A graph is an abstract
mathematical entity, which consists of a set whose elements are nodes, and a
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set of pairs of nodes. A diagram is a 2 dimensional expression of a graph, which
is the drawing of the web of the links interconnecting at the nodes. In a map,
faces are relevant, which are determined by the links and their intersections. A
network refers to either a graph, or a diagram. The map is not used in this
paper. The nodes in the graph represent persons, and the links represent the
transmission of influence. The links between the nodes which appeared in the
intelligence data set is inferred with the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
A parametric form is defined to describe the link topology. The probability
where the influence transmits from an initiating node nj to a responder node nk
is rjk. The influence transmits to multiple responders independently in parallel.
It is similar to the degree of collaboration probability in trust modeling [14].
Eq.(5) gives constraints on rjk.
0 ≤ rjk ≤ 1, rjj = 1 (0 ≤ j, k ≤ |n| − 1). (5)
The quantity fj is the probability where the node nj becomes an initiator.
The parameters rjk and fj are denoted by r collectively. It is the target to
estimate from the observation data set.
r = {rjk} ∪ {fj} (0 ≤ i, j ≤ |n| − 1). (6)
The logarithmic likelihood function [5] is defined by eq.(7). In statistics, a
likelihood function is a conditional probability function of the observation given
the parameters of a statistical model. It plays a key role in statistical inference
such as Bayes’ Law. The probability where D occurs for given r is denoted by
p(D|r).
L(r) = log(p(D|r)). (7)
The individual observations are assumed to be independent. Eq.(7) becomes
eq.(8).
L(r) = log(
|d|−1∏
i=0
p(di|r)) =
|d|−1∑
i=0
log(p(di|r)). (8)
The quantity fk|ij in eq.(9) is the probability where the presence or absence
of the node nk as a responder to the stimulating node nj coincides with the
observation di.
fk|ij =
{
rjk if dik = 1 for given i and j
1− rjk otherwise
. (9)
Eq.(9) is equivalent to eq.(10) since the value of dik is either 0 or 1.
fk|ij = dikrjk + (1− dik)(1 − rjk). (10)
The probability p(D|r) in eq.(8) is expressed by eq.(11).
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p(di|r) =
|n|−1∑
j=0
dijfj
∏
0 ≤ k ≤ |n| − 1
k 6= j
fk|ij . (11)
The logarithmic likelihood function is expressed by eq.(12).
L(r) =
|d|−1∑
i=0
log(
|n|−1∑
j=0
dijfj
|n|−1∏
k=0
{1− dik + (2dik − 1)rjk}). (12)
The maximal likelihood estimator rˆ is obtained by solving eq.(13). It rep-
resents the inferred topology of the network.
rˆ = argmax
r
L(r). (13)
Lagrange multipliers can be used to solve eq.(13) analytically. But, at
present, computational optimization is suitable to solve a large-scale problem.
The hill climbing method is a simple incremental optimization technique. Un-
suitable selection of the initial condition may lead to the sub-optimal solutions.
Advanced meta-heuristic algorithms such as simulated annealing, or genetic al-
gorithm [10] may be employed to avoid sub-optimal solutions. It is not within
the scope of this paper to explore the computational technique to solve eq.(13).
The details of the algorithm implementation are not described here.
3.3 Node Discovery
The clues on the covert node in the latent layer are discovered after the topol-
ogy of the links between the nodes, which appeared in the intelligence data set,
is inferred with the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) in 3.2. The degree
of suspiciousness (s(di)) is assigned to the individual intelligence data di. It is
defined as the likeliness where the covert node would appear in the intelligence
data, if it became overt, or if the wire-puller were observable. The degree of
suspiciousness is evaluated by eq.(14), where g(x) is a monotonically decreas-
ing function of the variable x. Larger value in eq.(14) means more suspicious
intelligence data.
s(di) ∝ g(p(di|rˆ)). (14)
Ranking of the intelligence data can be calculated from the value of eq.(14).
The k-th most suspicious intelligence data is given by dσ(k) in eq.(15). The
degree of suspiciousness of dσ(j) (s(dσ(j))) is larger than that of dσ(k) (s(dσ(k)))
for any j < k.
σ(k) = arg max
i 6= σ(j)
j < k
s(di) (0 ≤ k ≤ |d| − 1). (15)
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The degree of suspiciousness (s(nj)) can also be assigned to the individual
nodes nj . More suspicious node is more likely to be the neighbor node of the
covert node. Or, it is more likely to be the perpetrator who is associated with
the wire-puller closely. The degree of suspiciousness s(nj) can be evaluated by
accumulating the degree of suspiciousness of the intelligence data (s(di)), where
the node appears, as in eq.(16). The function w(k) is an appropriate weight
function.
s(nj) ∝
∑|d|−1
k=0 w(k)B(nj ∈ dσ(k))∑|d|−1
k=0 B(nj ∈ dk)
. (16)
The Boolean function in eq.(16) is defined by eq.(17).
B(x) =
{
1 if proposition x is True
0 otherwise
. (17)
Alternatively, much simpler means to discover the suspicious nodes may be
taken. The suspicious nodes are the neighbor nodes nnbr, which appear in the
most suspicious intelligence data dσ(0). It is denoted by eq.(18).
{nnbr} ∈ dσ(0). (18)
3.4 Social network visualization
The output of the link inference and node discovery is drawn as a social network
diagram, which predicts the position of the covert node ncvt with the suspicious
neighbor nodes nnbr. The link topology is relevant in the social network diagram.
But, the absolute position of the nodes, the distance between the nodes, the
direction along the vertical and horizontal axes are not relevant. The position
of the nodes is determined by the employed graph drawing algorithm. For
example, the spring model [8] is popular. The model converts the strength
of the relationship across the link between two nodes into Hooke’s constant of
the spring, which is placed between the nodes imaginarily, and calculates the
equilibrium position of the nodes.
At first, the social network of the nodes which appeared in the intelligence
data set is drawn. The communication in the latent layer is present between
the nodes nj and nk, if the maximal likelihood estimator rˆjk is larger than 0.
The estimator rˆjk approaches to either 1 or 0, in most cases. The link is drawn
if rˆjk > rthr, because strong relationship is of interest to the investigator. The
threshold rthr may be 0.9 or larger. Next, the suspicious nodes nnbr in eq.(18)
are added into the social network diagram with the discovered covert node ncvt.
The identity of the covert node nCVT is not known at this stage of investigation.
The covert node is, therefore, represented by an unlabeled (unnamed) node. The
links between the covert node and the suspicious neighbor nodes are drawn.
The parameter fˆ j , which is the probability where the node nj becomes an
initiator of communication, is not visualized into the topology of the social net-
work diagram. If it is necessary to indicate the value graphically, the largeness
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Table 1: The 19 perpetrators who are responsible for hijacking the 4 commercial
flights (number: AA11, AA77, UA93, and UA175) in the 9/11 terrorist attack,
and appear in a sample intelligence data set.
Flight Hijacker
AA11 Abdul A Al-Omari, Mohamed Atta, Satam Suqami, Wail Alshehri,
Waleed Alshehri
AA77 Hani Hanjour, Khalid Al-Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf Alhazmi,
Salern Alhazmi
UA93 Ahmed Al-Haznawi, Ahmed Alnami, Saeed Alghamdi, Ziad Jarrah
UA175 Ahmed Alghamdi, Fayez Ahmed, Hamza Alghamdi, Marwan Al-Shehhi,
Mohand Alshehri
of the value can be encoded into the color, or largeness of the symbol of the
node.
4 Visualization of the 9/11 terrorists
An example of visualizing the intelligence data set is demonstrated. The intelli-
gence data set is the records on the collective actions of the perpetrators of the
9/11 terrorist attack in 2001. The 19 perpetrators are listed in Table 1, who are
responsible for hijacking the 4 commercial flights in the 9/11 terrorist attack
(number: American Airlines AA11 (Boeing 767 from Boston to Los Angeles),
AA77 (Boeing 757 from Washington to Los Angeles), United Airlines AA175
(Boeing 767 from Boston to Los Angeles), and UA93 (Boeing 757 from Newark
to San Francisco)), and appear in a sample intelligence data set.
The intelligence data set is listed in Table 2. The data set is not real, but is
generated for the purpose of computer simulation. The intelligence data set is
the input to the method to generate a social network diagram, which predicts
the positions where the wire-pullers conceals themselves. The resulting social
network diagram is shown in Figure 2. It visualizes the inferred links between
the nodes, and the node discovered from the sample intelligence data set in
Table 2. The nodes represent the 19 perpetrators. The links represent the
transmission of influence between the perpetrators in the latent layer. They
govern the pattern of the collective actions in the observable layer, which were
recorded in the intelligence data set. The perpetrators in an intelligence data
do not form a simple clique structure, actually. For example, if the 8 nodes
in d9 formed a clique structure, the nodal degree of the nodes would be 7.
The actual nodal degree is much smaller than 7. The network is much less
densely connected than it would be if the perpetrators in a single intelligence
data formed a clique structure. The method reveals the less densely connected
topology of the terrorist organization.
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Table 2: Sample intelligence data set on the perpetrators in Table 1, which is
the input to the method (eq.(3) in 3.1) to generate a social network diagram.
Data Participant to a collective action
d0 {Abdul A Al-Omari, Fayez Ahmed, Hani Hanjour, Marwan Al-Shehhi,
Mohamed Atta, Salern Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah}
d1 {Abdul A Al-Omari, Hani Hanjour, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Mohamed Atta,
Nawaf Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah}
d2 {Abdul A Al-Omari, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Mohamed Atta, Waleed Alshehri}
d3 {Abdul A Al-Omari, Satam Suqami, Wail Alshehri, Waleed Alshehri}
d4 {Ahmed Alghamdi, Ahmed Al-Haznawi, Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi,
Mohand Alshehri, Nawaf Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi}
d5 {Ahmed Alghamdi, Hamza Alghamdi}
d6 {Ahmed Al-Haznawi, Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Nawaf Alhazmi,
Saeed Alghamdi}
d7 {Ahmed Al-Haznawi, Hamza Alghamdi, Saeed Alghamdi, Ziad Jarrah}
d8 {Ahmed Al-Haznawi, Hani Hanjour, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Mohamed Atta,
Salern Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah}
d9 {Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Hani Hanjour, Khalid Al-Mihdhar,
Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, Salern Alhazmi}
d10 {Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi}
d11 {Fayez Ahmed, Hamza Alghamdi, Mohand Alshehri}
d12 {Fayez Ahmed, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Mohamed Atta, Waleed Alshehri}
d13 {Fayez Ahmed, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Mohand Alshehri}
d14 {Hani Hanjour, Khalid Al-Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Marwan Al-Shehhi,
Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah}
d15 {Hani Hanjour, Khalid Al-Mihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi}
d16 {Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed}
d17 {Marwan Al-Shehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Salern Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah}
d18 {Satam Suqami, Wail Alshehri, Waleed Alshehri}
d19 {Satam Suqami, Wail Alshehri, Waleed Alshehri}
10
Figure 2: Social network diagram which visualizes the links between the nodes,
and the node discovered from the sample intelligence data set in Table 2. The
nodes represent the 19 perpetrators. The links represent the transmission of
influence between the perpetrators, which governs the pattern of the collective
actions which were recorded in the intelligence data set. The discovered node,
which is not labeled in the figure, indicates the position where the wire-puller
is most likely to conceal himself. The node has 4 links (red broken lines) to
Fayez Ahmed, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi, and Waleed Alshehri. They
are the keystone neighbors for the run-down and arrest of the wire-puller. The
wire-puller in the figure turns out to be Mustafa A. Al-Hisawi in [13].
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The discovered node ncvt, which is not labeled (named) in the figure, indi-
cates the position where the wire-puller is most likely to conceal himself. The
node has links (red broken lines) to the 4 neighbor nodes: Fayez Ahmed, Mo-
hamed Atta, Marwan Al-Shehhi, and Waleed Alshehri. The neighbor nodes
are nnbr ∈ d12, because dσ(0) = d12 is the most suspicious intelligence data.
Mohamed Atta and Waleed Alshehri hijacked the flight AA11, which flew into
the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Mohamed Atta was the leader of
the hijackers. Waleed Alshehri assisted Mohammed Atta. Fayez Ahmed and
Marwan Al-Shehhi hijacked the flight UA175, which flew into the South Tower.
Marwan Al-Shehhi, who trained at a pilot school with Mohammed Atta, flew
the aircraft. Fayez Ahmed was also a pilot. The wire-puller was a linkage be-
tween the 2 flights which were used as weapon to the financial landmark of the
United States. They are the keystone neighbors to investigate to unravel who
is the wire-puller, or what is behind the terrorist attack.
The ties between the persons concerned are revealed by [13]. They include
the 19 perpetrators, conspirators, and suspects. The tie strength is estimated
by the amount of time together by a pair of terrorists. Those living together,
attending the same school, or the same training would have strong ties. Those
traveling together, and participating in meetings together would have ties of
moderate strength. Finally, those who were recorded as having a financial trans-
action together, or participating in an occasional meeting would have weak ties.
Publicly available data is used as such intelligence data set. By comparing with
the ties in [13], the wire-puller in Figure 2 turns out to be Mustafa A. Al-Hisawi.
He is believed to be a financial manager of Al Qaeda, and to give Fayez Ahmed
a credit card as a financial support for the attack.
Remind that this result is for demonstration purpose. The objective is to
demonstrate how the intuitive visualization can help the investigator diagnose
the intelligence data set, rather than to uncover the real role of Mustafa A.
Al-Hisawi, or Usama bin Laden in the 9/11 terrorist attack.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a computational method to analyze the intelligence data
set on the collective actions of the perpetrators of the terrorist attack, and to vi-
sualize it into the form of a social network diagram, which predicts the positions
where the wire-pullers conceals themselves. This will help the investigators, who
have a limited time window to diagnose the organizational background of the
terrorists, to run down and arrest the wire-pullers, and to take an action to
prevent or eradicate the terrorist attack. The intuitive interface to visualize the
intelligence data set will stimulate the investigators’ experience and knowledge,
and aids them in decision-making for an immediately effective action.
The important aspect of the presented method is that the diagnosis of the
investigator illustrated in Figure 1 can be repeated many times. The investigator
can predict the position of Mustafa A. Al-Hisawi from the intelligence data set
on the 19 perpetrators. Then, once the wire-puller is identified as Mustafa A.
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Al-Hisawi, the intelligence data set on Mustafa A. Al-Hisawi should be collected
and added to the diagnosis. Similarly, the investigator can predict the position
of the 21st person again from the intelligence data set on the 19 perpetrators
and Mustafa A. Al-Hisawi.
The method provides the investigator with the intuitively comprehensible
direction of potentially fruitful investigation from what is already known toward
what is not, but can be known.
References
[1] C. Anderson, S. Wasserman, and B. Crouch, A p∗ primer, Logit models
for social networks, Social Networks 21, 37-66 (1999).
[2] L. A. Adamic, and E. Adar, Friends and neighbors on the web, Social
Networks 25, 211-228 (2003).
[3] P. J. Carrington, J. Scott, and S. Wasserman eds., Models And Methods
In Social Network Analysis. Cambridge University Press (2005).
[4] A. Clauset, C. Moore, and M. E. J. Newman, Hierarchical structure
and the prediction of missing links in networks, Nature 453, 98-101
(2008).
[5] R. O. Duda, P. E. Hart, and D. G. Stork, Pattern classification. Wiley-
Interscience (2000).
[6] O. Frank, and D. Strauss, Markov graphs, Journal of the American
Statistical Association 81, 832-842 (1986).
[7] N. Friedman, K. Murphy, and S. Russell, Learning the structure of dy-
namic probabilistic networks, in Proceedings of the Annual Conference
on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Madison (1998).
[8] T. M. J. Fruchterman, and E. M. Reingold, Graph drawing by force-
directed placement, Software - Practice and Experience 18, 1129-1164
(1991).
[9] L. Getoor, and C. P. Diehl, Link mining: a survey, ACM SIGKDD
Explorations 7, 3-12 (2005).
[10] T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman, The elements of statisti-
cal learning - Data mining, inference, and prediction. Springer-Verlag
(2001).
[11] P. S. Keila, and D. B. Skillicorn, Structure in the Enron email dataset,
Journal of Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 11,
183-199 (2006).
13
[12] P. Klerks, The network paradigm applied to criminal organizations,
Connections 24, 53-65 (2002).
[13] V. E. Krebs, Mapping networks of terrorist cells, Connections 24, 43-52
(2002).
[14] N. Lavrac˘, P. Ljubic˘, T. Urbanc˘ic˘, G. Papa, M. Jermol, and S. Boll-
halter, Trust modeling for networked organizations using reputation
and collaboration estimates, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, &
Cybernetics Part C 37, 429-439 (2007).
[15] D. Liben-Nowell, and J. M. Kleinberg, The link prediction problem for
social networks, Journal of American Society of Information Science
and Technology 58, 1019-1031 (2007).
[16] Y. Maeno, and Y. Ohsawa, Human-computer interactive annealing for
discovering invisible dark events, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Elec-
tronics 54, 1184-1192 (2007).
[17] Y. Maeno, and Y. Ohsawa, Analyzing covert social network foundation
behind terrorism disaster, in press, International Journal of Services
Sciences (2008) (available e-print http://arxiv.org/abs/0710.4231).
[18] C. Morselli, C. Giguere, and K. Petit, The efficiency/security trade-off
in criminal networks, Social Networks 29, 143-153 (2007).
[19] Y. Ohsawa, Data crystallization: chance discovery extended for dealing
with unobservable events, New Mathematics and Natural Computation
1, 373-392 (2005).
[20] M. Sageman, Understanding terror networks. University of Pennsylva-
nia Press (2004).
[21] R. Silva, R. Scheines, C. Glymour, and P. Spirtes, Learning the struc-
ture of linear latent variable models, Journal of Machine Learning Re-
search 7, 191-246 (2006).
[22] S. Singh, J. Allanach, T. Haiying, K. Pattipati, and P. Willett, Stochas-
tic modeling of a terrorist event via the ASAM system, in Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man & Cybernetics,
Hague (2004).
[23] B. Taskar, M. F. Wong, P. Abbeel, and D. Koller, Link prediction in
relational data, in Proceedings of the Neural Information Processing
Systems Conference, Vancouver (2003).
14
